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11.     Introduction
Wage differences constitute a central explanation for the increasing business practice
of international outsourcing across industries (see e.g. Sinn (2007) or Stefanova
(2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing). It is important to
mention that Amiti and Wei (2005) and Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big
difference in labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in
outsourcing of both manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs. Of
course one reason for these wage gaps is the difference of labour market institutions.
In most western European countries the wage is still determined by bargaining
between firms and trade unions, but e.g. in eastern European or Asian countries there
is either no wage bargaining or trade unions are much weaker.
Concerning the analysis of the effect of outsourcing on compensation
schemes under wage bargaining there are two focuses in the literature, the case of
committed outsourcing and flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case,
outsourcing takes place before wage bargaining1, but in the flexible case outsourcing
is decided after wage bargaining. Our focus in this paper is to assume that outsourcing
is flexible, i.e. determined simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but after
wage formation. Skaksen (2004) has analyzed flexible outsourcing using a Cobb-
Douglas production function by assuming that output good is produced by combining
two intermediate activities, where one activity can be perfect substitute by
outsourcing. Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-stage
game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the labour union sets
wages before firms decide on the degree of outsourcing. But in these papers they have
abstracted from the analysis of profit sharing as a part of the compensation scheme,
which is our focus.2
Since in the case of flexible outsourcing wage bargaining has taken before
outsourcing decision, the opportunity of external procurement can be use as a threat in
1 See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage
bargaining. Also e.g. Danthine and Hunt (12994), Zhao (2001) and Koskela and Stenbacka
(2007) have analyzed committed outsourcing issue.
2 There are also some new analysis, which incorporated flexible outsourcing and wage bargaining,
e.g. Koskela and Poutvaara (2008) or Koskela (2008). But the mainly focus in these papers are
labour taxation issues in the absence of profit sharing.
2the bargaining round and lowers the wage. If domestic labour and outsourcing are
perfect substitutes, domestic wages have to be lower than outsourcing cost, so the
price for external procurement is an upper bound. It is intuitively that to keep
domestic production attractive, it needs lower marginal costs or wages. If lower costs
are not possible, then firms have to increase productivity of domestic production,
which is influenced by workers’ effort. One way to try to stimulate effort is profit
sharing, which may reduce wages because part of the former base wage can be
substituted by profit income. Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an
important phenomenon in many OECD countries. Pendleton et al (2001) have
presented delailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 OECD countries.3 As profit
sharing is now commonly incorporated in the compensation schemes and international
outsourcing has recently increased e.g. in western EU-countries and in the United
States, it is important to study the implications of both outsourcing and profit sharing
for wage bargaining and equilibrium unemployment.4
We extend the literature of flexible outsourcing by implementing profit
sharing as a part to the compensation scheme. In our analysis we distinguish two
different time sequences of profit sharing, i.e. by assuming that profit sharing might
be committed or flexible in terms of wage formation. The idea behind the
implementation of profit sharing is that this will induce incentives to increase effort
and so productivity for given wage level. Profit sharing will also affect the wage
formation, what could lead to a lower base wage since a part of the former wage level
is substitute by profit income.
In this paper we analyze the following questions associated with flexible
outsourcing both with committed and flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic
labour markets. First, how does outsourcing cost influence both wage formation and
profit sharing? Second, how does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? Third,
what is the relationship between flexible outsourcing, profit sharing and equilibrium
unemployment, when profit sharing is also a part of the compensation schemes in
other industries?
3         See also Conyon and Freeman (2001).
4 In the presence of committed outsourcing sharing, which is decided before wage formation,
Koskela and König (2008) have analyzed the relationship between profit sharing, exogenous
outsourcing and equilibrium unemployment.
3We find that in both profit sharing scenarios lower outsourcing cost lowers the
wage. In the presence of flexile outsourcing profit sharing is a supplementary or
compensating part of income. If there is no outsourcing, profit sharing has also an
ambiguous character. In the presence of flexible outsourcing optimal flexible profit
sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing. Moreover, lower outsourcing
cost and higher wage will have ambiguous effect on optimal flexible profit sharing
and also on optimal committed profit sharing.
In the case of zero effort elasticity there is of course no committed or flexible
profit sharing in the absence or presence of outsourcing. In these cases the wages are
the same both in the presence and absence of outsourcing. Under positive effort
elasticity without outsourcing higher profit sharing will lead to a smaller wage
compared to the flexible case and vice versa.
In terms of equilibrium unemployment the effects of outsourcing cost and
profit sharing are ambiguous both in the committed and flexible profit sharing. In the
absence of outsourcing profit sharing will also have an ambiguous unemployment
effect. Moreover, if effort elasticity is zero, higher outsourcing cost will enhance the
unemployment.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical
framework in the presence of flexible outsourcing and two different time sequences in
terms of profit sharing decision. The determination of labour demand, outsourcing
and employee effort are presented in Section 3. Section 4 investigates the wage
formation by monopoly labour union with committed profit sharing and in section 5
with flexible outsourcing and flexible profit sharing. Section 6 explores the
implications of flexible outsourcing and different time decisions of profit sharing on
equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we present conclusions in section 7.
2.    The Basic Framework
We assume that output depends not only on domestic labour and international
outsourcing, but also on the effort by workers, i.e. the workers’ productivity. This lies
in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis (see e.g. the book edited by
4Akerlof and Yellen (1986)). We analyze two alternative timing decisions. The timing
structure (I) captures the idea that the representative firm is flexible to decide about
the amount of outsourcing simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but commits
to profit sharing in anticipation of wage determination. After the firm has decided
about profit sharing, the monopoly trade union set the wage with respect to the profit
share level. Knowing the base wage the representative firm determines outsourcing
and employment. If the wage and profit share level is known, the representative
worker decides on effort provision. The partly alternative timing structure (II) will
change the timing of determination of profit sharing and wage determination so that
the representative firm decides profit sharing after wage formation. If both
compensation parts are known the firm will be flexible to decide on outsourcing and
labour demand. Also the worker will decide about his effort after knowing the
earnings components. We summarize these alternative timing decisions in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Alternative time sequences of decisions in terms of outsourcing,
employment, effort, wage formation and profit sharing
(I)   Flexible outsourcing and committed profit sharing:
   Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
 profit wage outsourcing M , labour demand L
   sharing ?                 formation w and effort determination e
(II)  Flexible outsourcing and flexible profit sharing:
    Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
   wage profit outsourcing M , labour demand L
   formation w            sharing ? and effort determination e
In the following sections we analyze these two alternative time sequences of
decisions both in the case of committed profit sharing and flexible profit sharing in
terms of the relationship to the wage formation of the monopoly labour union.
53.    Optimal Outsourcing, Labour Demand and Employee Effort
In this section we characterize the optimal labour demand and outsourcing by the
representative firm and the effort by the representative worker by taking profit
sharing, ? , and wage, w , as given. The revenue function is presented as
? ? ? ? ?
?
?
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1
,
?
?
?
? MeLMLR , 1??                (1)
where L  is the amount of domestic labour and M the firm’s labour input acquired
from external suppliers through outsourcing. Here we assume that there is a perfect
substitutability between domestic labour and outsourcing.5
The firm decides on domestic labour and outsourcing so as to maximize the
profit function
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1
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by taking worker’s effort, the negotiated wage and profit sharing as given. We assume
that there is a convex cost of establishing capacity for foreign outsourced activity. The
first-order conditions are ? ? 0
1
????? ? wMeLeL ?? and ? ? 0
1
???? ? cMMeLM ??
and these can be expressed as
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5 Concerning 1??  specifying the inverse product function according to a monopolistic product
market competition (for details, see the seminal paper by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) as
1,
1
1
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? Dp  gives the inverse elasticity of demand ?/1/ ?? pDDp so that
??? DpDp / . Assuming MeLF ?? and DF ?  gives another suggestion for (1).
6Domestic labour demand is a negative function of wage and the amount of
outsourcing and a positive function of both outsourcing cost and effort. Higher
outsourcing will decrease domestic labour demand, which lies in conformity with
empirics (see e.g. Senses (2006)). However, labour demand does not directly depend
on profit sharing, which lies also in conformity with empirical evidence.6 For
outsourcing we found that the external procurement is a positive function of wage rate
and a negative function of both outsourcing cost and effort. The reactions could be
described by the outsourcing elasticities in terms of outsourcing cost, effort and wage
as follows: 1???
M
eM
M
cM ec  and 0)1( ??? ?
M
wM w  so that these are constant.
The effort provision of the worker is associated with a disutility, which is
assumed to satisfy the following convex function ? ? ?? /1eeg ?  with 10 ?? ? , i.e.
? ? ? ? 0'',' ?egeg . The individual utility function for the employed worker is (4a) and
for the unemployed worker (4b)
? ?eg
L
wv ??? ?? ,                                                    (4a)
bv ? ,                                                                         (4b)
where ?  captures the firm’s profit and b stands for the unemployed worker’s
exogenous outside option.
Utility maximization yields the optimal effort level. The first-order condition
in terms of effort determination for (4a) is
? ? 0' ??? eg
L
v ee ?
? .                                                   (5)
Using ? ? ? ? 1/1' ?? ?eeg  and ? ? LMeLe ??
1???  equation (5) implies
? ? ?? we ? ,                                                                    (6)
6         See e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997).
7where
e
we
e
e w?? ?? ?  is the elasticity of effort with respect to profit sharing and wage
rate (see about this, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006)). Therefore the optimal effort by
worker is
w
eew
?
?  and
?
?
?
ee ? , so that profit sharing and base wage enhance
productivity by increasing effort provision and affect positively labour demand
indirectly.7 But outsourcing will have no effect in the case of perfect substitutability
between outsourcing and effective domestic labour.
The wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important later
on, can be expressed as
? ? ? ? ? ?
eL
M
eL
M
L
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?
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where ? ? ???? ??
?
?
?
?
? ???
eL
Mc 11  is the wage elasticity of labour demand under
committed outsourcing. In both scenarios the wage elasticity depends on parameters
?  and ?  and also on outsourcing and wage rate via L and e .
4.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Flexible
Outsourcing and Committed Profit Sharing
Now we analyze the timing structure (I) when the representative firm commits to
profit sharing before the wage formation by allowing for their effects on labour
demand and effort determination.
7 This finding lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and
Wilson (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Kruse (1992), and Wadhwani and Wall (1990)). Of
course, we have to mention that these issues have not been studied to our knowledge empirically
in the presence of outsourcing. Also in the theoretical focus of the literature we find evidence of
increasing effort by higher wages, see e.g. Lin et al. (2002).
84.1.     Wage Formation under Committed Profit Sharing
By analyzing the wage formation under committed profit sharing the objective
function of monopoly labour union is assumed to be ? ? vLNvLV ??? , which we
can rewrite by using equations (4a) and (4b) as
? ? ? ? bNLegLbwV ????? ?? , (8)
where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labour union members N .
Maximizing in terms of the base wage subject to labour demand, effort determination,
and profit sharing, gives
? ? ? ? ? ? 0' ??????? wwwww eeLgLegbwLLV ?? ,                           (9)
which can be solved as ? ?? ? bw ???? ???? )1(1 , so that we have
? ? bw ??
?
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?
11 ????
? .                                            (10)
This is an implicit form concerning wage formation because both the nominator and
denominator of the mark-up depend in a non-linear way on the wage rate. First we
have to show the relationship between wage elasticity of labour demand and base
wage, profit sharing and outsourcing cost.
The dependence of the wage elasticity of labour demand on base wage is
characterized by ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ??
?
?
?
? ????? 211 eL
eLLeMeLM www
w ???  so that we have a positive
relation between elasticity and base wage, i.e.
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9by using ? ?? ? 01111 ??
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M????? . In the absence of outsourcing we
have 0
0
?
?Mw
?  so wage does not affect the wage elasticity of labour demand and the
wage elasticity in this case is smaller, i.e. ?????? ?????
?
)1(
0M
. In this case the
wage elasticity is constant and the base wage can be expressed as
? ? bww M ??
?
?
?
?
???
??
? 110 ????
? ,                                         (10’)
which is an explicit specification.
The reaction of the wage elasticity subject to profit sharing in the presence of
outsourcing is ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ??
?
?
?
? ????? 211 eL
eLLeMeLM ???
? ???  so that it can be written as
? ?? ? 0111 2 ??
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Higher profit sharing will increase effort and so effective labour, so that the wage
elasticity of labour demand is more inelastic. In the absence of outsourcing, profit
sharing does not affect the wage elasticity of labour demand, i.e. 0
0
?
?M?
? . The
reaction of the wage elasticity subject to outsourcing cost is described by
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ??
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L
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M
c ??? .              (13)
Higher outsourcing cost will decrease the wage elasticity of labor demand and will
reduce ceteris paribus the demand of outsourcing, which leads to a decrease of the
ratio of outsourcing and effective labour, which makes the labour damnd more
inelastic. This lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Hasan et al. ((2007),
Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2006)).
10
We can look at the wage reaction concerning changes in profit sharing and
outsourcing cost by taking the total differentiation of equation (10). For the effect of
profit sharing on the base wage by using ? ?
?
??? 1)1( ???? wb , we found (see
Appendix A)
?
)/1)(1()1(
)1(/)1( ?
????
????
??????
?????
?
?
w
ww
d
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w
, (14)
where .0)/1)(1( ??? ??? ww
8 In the absence of outsourcing we have
?
1)1(
)1(
0
?
???
????
? ????
??
? ?
ww
d
dw
M
,                                      (15)
so that profit sharing could have both in the presence and absence of outsourcing an
supplementary or complementary character.9 This results since profit sharing has
opposed effects on the mark-up. In the presence of outsourcing, higher profit sharing
will decrease wage elasticity so that a higher wage will have a smaller value loss of
the trade union via less dismissal and it is beneficial for the union to set a higher
wage. This describes the indirect effect. The direct effect of profit sharing on the base
wage, we can see in the denominator of (10) and (10’). Here we can distinguish two
working channels. The first part of the denominator describes the productivity
channel, since it depends on the effort elasticity ? . Higher profit sharing will enhance
the productivity effect and will lead to an increasing base wage. In the second part of
the denominator we have the substitution effect. This effect will decrease the base
wage, which means that a former part of the base wage is substituted by profit
income. So in our analysis we have the interplay of the positive indirect effect via
wage elasticity and the ambiguous direct effect via a positive productivity effect and a
8 This result is available upon request.
9 There is also some empirical evidence for both properties. Black and Lynch (2000) show by
using U.S. data, that profit sharing results in lower regular pay for workers, what implies a
compensatory character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by using UK data and also in Kraft
and Ugarkovic (2005) by using German panel data it has been shown that introducing profit
sharing do not reduce the wage, what implies a supplementary character.
11
negative substitution effect. In the case of no outsourcing we know that the wage
elasticity is constant, so that in this case implementing profit sharing will induce only
the ambiguous direct effect.
For the special case of zero effort elasticity, 0?? , in the presence of
outsourcing in our model we observe for the direct working channel only the
substitution effect, since a single worker has no effect on the firm profit he will
provide in any case a constant effort level of one. Also in this scenario we have an
ambiguous effect of implementing profit sharing, since the substitution effect will
lower the wage, while the indirect effect will increase the wage. But for the special
case of zero effort elasticity in the absence of outsourcing there is negative effect of
implementing profit sharing, i.e. 0
10
?
?
??
?? ?? ?
w
d
dw
M
.
In the case of outsourcing cost we get
? ? 0)/1)(1()1(
/)1( ?
????
??
?????
???
w
w
dc
dw
w
c ,                               (16)
so that lower outsourcing cost in the presence of flexible outsourcing will lower the
wage. This holds, since lower outsourcing cost means for given wage level higher
outsourcing demand, so that the labour demand elasticity becomes more elastic. As a
result of this the wage has to fall, since the trade union can avoid higher outsourcing
with lower in-house cost and make integrated production more attractive.10
We can summarize our findings to
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing profit sharing is a
supplementary or compensating part of income and lower outsourcing
cost will lower the wage. If there is no outsourcing, profit sharing has
also an ambiguous character on the base wage.
Now we analyze the effect of implementing profit sharing in a firm which engages in
outsourcing. From the former results we can rewrite the working channel of
10  This lies in conformity with empirics according to which there is substitutability between
outsourcing and domestic labour (see e.g. Munch and Skaksen (2005)).
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committed profit sharing on the amount of outsourcing as
??? d
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w
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d
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dM ?
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w
ee
d
de ?
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??
?
?? . Inserting the different expression and simplifying yields
?1 ????? M
d
dw
ced
dM
?
?
?
?
?
(17)
The effect of implementing profit sharing is ambiguous since the effect on the base
wage is ambiguous. For the case of a complementary character we know that 0?
?d
dw .
In this scenario implementing profit sharing will reduce the demand for outsourcing.
This relationship is intuitively for the following reason. Higher profit sharing will
increase effort, since workers participate on the firms profit and have an incentive to
increase the profit by higher effort. When higher effort leads to an increasing labour
demand some outsourcing activities will be avoided. But higher profit sharing will
also affect the base wage. If profit sharing has a complementary character, higher
profit sharing leads to a lower base wage. Since only the base wage enters the
marginal cost, the advantage of integrated production increases by inducing a higher
labour demand. In what follows the amount of outsourcing will be lower with higher
profit sharing. In this case profit sharing has to working channels. The first is the
stimulating productivity effect by higher effort and the second is the wage reduction
effect by substituting wage income by profit income. Both channels are working in
the same directions and lead to lower outsourcing demand so that we have
Proposition 2: If profit sharing has a compensatory character,
implementing committed profit sharing will stimulating productivity and
decrease the marginal cost, so that in this case outsourcing activities are
decreasing.
4.2.     Committed Profit Sharing
13
Concerning the timing structure (I) the representative firm commits to profit sharing
to maximize profit subject to labour demand (3a), outsourcing (3b), effort
determination (6) and wage formation (10) so that
? ? ? ? ??
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? ???
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??
?
2
1
2
1
1
1 cMwLMeLMax ?
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? ?
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? ??? we ?
? ? ? ? bw cc ????
?
???
?
11
The first-order condition is ? ? 01 ???? ???? , where the indirect profit can be
written as ? ? 2
2
11
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? . Its first derivative with respect to profit sharing
is ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?22
22
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? ?? . Using this term to solving the
first-order condition ? ? 01 ???? ????  yields the optimal committed profit sharing
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and without outsourcing we have
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To compare the profit share level, we have to take a look on the wage elasticity with
respect to profit sharing in the case with and without outsourcing. Concerning the
relationship between (19) and (20) we try to answer the inequality of committed profit
sharing in the presence and absence of outsourcing, i.e.
0?
?
M
cc ?? . From this starting
point we get the simplified expression (B2):
?? ??? ????????
??
??
?
??
? ??????????
eL
M
w
w
w
w
eL
M
2
11
2
1 ????? ??  (for details see Appendix B). Since the
sign of the wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing is the decisive factor but we
cannot identify the influence of profit sharing on wages (see (14) and (15)), we have
to make some assumptions about the wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing. In
terms of this issue we can distinguish the following four cases:
Case I: 0?
w
w ?? and 0?
w
w ?? .
We can conclude that in this case the RHS of (B2) is positive and the LHS is
negative. Since the given relation in our starting point is
0?
?
M
cc ??   we see that this
is not fulfilled. In this case we have a decreasing profit sharing if a firm engages in
outsourcing activities.
Case II: 0?
w
w ?? and 0?
w
w ?? .
In this case the RHS of (B2) is positive but the sign of the LHS is a priori
ambiguous. Therefore, we cannot conclude in this case if profit sharing in the
presence of outsourcing bigger or smaller than in the case without outsourcing.
Case III: 0?
w
w ?? and 0?
w
w ?? .
In this case both sides of (B2) are negative but we cannot conclude if profit
sharing in the presence of outsourcing is bigger or smaller than in the case without
outsourcing.
Case IV: 0?
w
w ?? and 0?
w
w ?? .
In this case the RHS of (B2) is negative, but the sign of the LHS is a priori
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ambiguous. Therefore we cannot conclude if profit sharing in the presence of
outsourcing is bigger or smaller than in the case without outsourcing.
We can summarize our findings to
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing, optimal
committed profit sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing if
in absence of outsourcing profit sharing has a complementary character
but in the presence of outsourcing a supplementary character.
For the special case of a zero effort elasticity but positive outsourcing, we can
simplify the wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing to
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
? ???
??
?
?
?
???
??
?
?
ˆ
ˆ
11ˆ
0
0 ww
w
w
M
, with ? ?
L
M??? ??? 1ˆ . Solving for the optimal
committed profit share we found
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ˆ
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?
?
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L
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M
w
Mc , (21)
because 0
ˆ
)
ˆ
1(ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1 ??????
?
?
?
??
?
? ww . This means that in the presence of outsourcing
and zero effort elasticity, 0?? , the firm will desist from profit sharing. This is
reasonable since in a case of zero effort elasticity the worker will only provide the
minimum effort level of 1. The provision of the minimum effort level is the dominate
strategy for a worker, because he/she has no influence on the firm’s profit. Since the
decision about effort provision is unchanged also if the firm will set same incentives
with introducing profit sharing, the firm will only distributed a part of her profit to the
workers without effects on effort or profit. So it is beneficial for the firm to avoiding
profit sharing. The same holds if the firm doesn’t engage in outsourcing, i.e.
0
0
00
??
?
???
Mc
M
c
??
??  from (21).
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5.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Flexible
Outsourcing and Flexible Profit Sharing
We now use the timing structure (II) to analyze the wage formation by the monopoly
labour union before flexible profit sharing by the representative firm, which means
that the firm will decide for profit sharing after the wage level.
5.1.      Flexible Profit Sharing
First we study the case when profit sharing is decided to maximize profit by taking
the base wage as given and anticipating the outsourcing and labour demand decision
and effort so that
? ? ? ? ??
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? ???
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2
1
2
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1
1 cMwLMeLMax ?
?
? ?
???    s.t.          (22)
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The first-order condition is similar as in the case of committed profit sharing,
i.e. ? ? 01 ???? ???? , where the indirect profit is ? ? 2
2
11
2
1
1
1
ce
wew ?
?
? ?? ??
?
? . In
comparison with committed outsourcing case the partial derivative of the profit in
terms of profit sharing is different because in this case the wage is given, i.e.
wL
e
wMewe
ce
weew
?
?
?
?? ????
??
? ???
?
??
? ???? ???? 113
2
21 , so that the first-order condition
can be written as ? ?wL
ce
w
e
wMwL ?
?
?
?
????
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
. This can be solved for the
optimal flexible profit sharing in the presence of flexible outsourcing as
? ?
? ? ? ? ??
?
??
? ????
??
eL
M
f
2
111
1
???
??? .                                      (23)
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This is also an implicit form, because both employee effort and labour demand also
depend on profit sharing in a non-linear way. In the absence of outsourcing the
optimal flexible profit share can be expressed as
? ?
? ???
????
11
1
0 ??
???
?
f
M
f .                                         (24)
Therefore under flexible profit sharing in the presence of outsourcing the optimal
flexible profit share is smaller than in the  absence of outsourcing, i.e. ff ?? ?
because ? ? .0
2
1 ??
eL
M?
After knowing the optimal value of the profit share, we can analyze the effects
of changes in the outsourcing cost and the base wage (see Appendix C).
Differentiating (23) first with respect to profit sharing and outsourcing cost gives
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
?
11
12
11
1
12
1 2
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
eL
M
eL
M
eL
M
eLc
M
dc
d f
?
?
??
??
??
? .                                             (25)
Since the nominator of (25) is positive, higher outsourcing cost will increase the
optimal flexible profit share only if ? ?? ?? ? 01112
11 ??
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
?
?
eL
M
eL
M?
?
?? . If it is not the
case, higher outsourcing cost will decrease the optimal flexible profit sharing. But in
the absence of outsourcing there is no effect of outsourcing cost on flexible profit
sharing, i.e. 0?
dc
d f? . Differentiating (23) with respect to profit sharing and wage
gives
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
?
11
12
11
111
12
1 2
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
? ???
?
??
?
eL
M
eL
M
eL
M
eLw
M
dw
d f
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
??
? .                         (26)
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Since the nominator is negative, higher wage will decrease the optimal flexible
profit share only if ? ?? ?? ? 01112
11 ??
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
?
?
eL
M
eL
M?
?
?? . If it is not the case, higher wage
formation will decrease the optimal flexible profit sharing. But also in the absence of
outsourcing there is no effect of outsourcing cost on flexible profit sharing, i.e.
0
0
?
?M
f
dc
d? . If the assumption is not fulfilled, then the opposite occurs and profit
sharing will decrease with higher base wage. In the absence of outsourcing we have
no effect of wage rate on flexible profit sharing, i.e. 0
0
?
?M
f
dw
d? .
As in the committed case we can in flexible case show the impact of
implementing profit sharing on outsourcing. Now the effect is described by
?? ?
??
?
?? e
e
M
d
dM  with ee
?
?
?
?
?
?  and
ce
w
e
M
2???
? , so that
0???? M
d
dM
?
?
?
. (27)
In opposite to implementing committed profit sharing here only the productivity
effect will affect the outsourcing demand, since flexible profit sharing will not affect
wage formation. As we mentioned earlier the productivity effect is intuitively. Since
now workers participate on the firm profit, they have an incentive to increase the
profit by higher effort. For given wage this will lead to higher labour demand so that
some outsourcing activities will be avoided.
We can summarize these findings to
Proposition 4:
a) In the presence of flexible outsourcing optimal flexible profit
sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing. Moreover,
lower outsourcing cost and higher wage will have ambiguous effects
on optimal flexible profit sharing, but in the absence of outsourcing
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higher wage rate and outsourcing cost will have no effects on
flexible profit sharing.
b) Implementing flexible profit sharing will increase worker’s
productivity and will substituting outsourcing by increasing
domestic labour.
As in the case of committed profit sharing, we can also distinguish between the cases
of a effort elasticity of zero, 0?? , and a positive elasticity with 10 ?? ? . It is easy
to see from (23) and (24) that in the absence or presence of outsourcing zero effort
elasticity results in no flexible profit sharing, i.e. 0
0
0
0
??
??
?
? M
fMf
??
?? . The reason
for this is, as mentioned in the committed case, that the worker will always provide
the minimum level of effort since he has no influence on profit.
We can also compare equations (19) and (24) as well as (20) and (24) to give
a statement about what for timing structure concerning profit sharing is preferred by
the worker. In a general comparison, what includes the case of positive and no
outsourcing, we found that the optimal committed profit share is higher as the optimal
flexible profit share if committed profit sharing has a complementary character,
0?
?d
dw , i.e. fc ?? ?  and fc ?? ? (see Appendix D). Of course in the case of zero
effort elasticity the firm will always desists from profit sharing.
We can summarize these findings to
Proposition 5:
a) If in the committed case profit sharing has a complementary
character on wages, then the committed profit share is higher as in
the flexible case. The opposite holds if committed profit sharing has
a supplementary character.
b) If committed profit sharing has no effect of wage formation, then the
profit shares are in the committed and flexible case the same.
c) In the case of zero effort elasticity, there is no profit sharing as well
as in the committed or flexible case and in the absence or presence
of outsourcing.
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5.2.     Wage Formation under Flexible Profit Sharing
We now analyze the wage formation by the monopoly labour union under flexible
outsourcing by using the objective function (9). Maximizing in terms of the base wage
subject to labour demand, effort determination, and profit sharing determination,
gives
? ? ? ? ? ? 0' ???????? wwwwww eeLgLegbwLLV ???? .                (28)
Additional to equation (10) under committed profit sharing there is the new term
w?? , which characterizes the effect of the wage formation on profit sharing. The
solution of (28) is ? ? b
L
w fff
w
??????? ??
?
?
?
?
? ???? 11 , so that we have
? ?
b
L
w
fff
w
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
????
? ??????
?
11
,                                 (29)
which is also an implicit formulation for wage formation. In the case of flexible profit
sharing, wage formation will affect profit sharing. For this term f
w
?  we found from
equation (26) that ??? fw
f
dw
d ?? . Therefore the wage will have an ambiguous effect
on optimal flexible profit sharing in the presence of flexible outsourcing, but no effect
in the absence of outsourcing, i.e. 0?fw? . In the absence of outsourcing the wage
formation is the following
? ? bww ffM ??
?
?
?
?
???
??
? 110 ????
? , (30)
which is an explicit specification, since ? ? ???? ??? 1 . Comparing equations (29)
and (30) we know that in the absence of outsourcing the labour demand elasticity is
smaller and the profit share is bigger than in the presence of outsourcing, i.e.
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?? ? and ff ?? ? . However there are opposed effects in the denominator, so we
cannot give a statement whether the wage in the absence of outsourcing is bigger or
smaller as in the presence of outsourcing, i.e. ww ?  or ww ? .
Indeed we can compare the wage in the committed and flexible case for some
special assumptions.
Case I: No outsourcing ( 0?M ) and positive effort elasticity ( 10 ?? ? ).
If there is no outsourcing, the labour demand elasticity is constant,
? ? ???? ??? 1 . And also we know from equation (24) that in the flexible case the
wage does not influence the profit share, so we can rewrite the base wages as
? ? bw cc
c
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
11 ????
?  and ? ? bw ff
f
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
11 ????
? . A comparison of the
wage levels show that the wage relation depends on the profit sharing level. If the
optimal profit sharing in the flexible case smaller than in the committed case then the
wage level in the flexible case is higher. As we mentioned in section 5.1 the relation
of the profit share level depends on the wage reaction in the committed case (see also
Appendix D). In the case of a complementary character of profit sharing in the
committed case, i.e. 0?
?
?
c
cw
?
, we found fc ?? ? . So a complementary profit income
leads in the committed case to a higher profit share as in the flexible case, but this
however results in lower base wage as in the flexible case, i.e. fc ww ? . If the
committed profit sharing has a supplementary character, i.e. 0?
?
?
c
cw
?
, we know that
fc ?? ?  which leads to fc ww ? . The conclusion is that a higher profit share is
financed by a smaller base wage.
Case II: No or positive outsourcing ( 0?M  or 0?M ) and zero effort elasticity
( 0?? ).
In this case we know, that the firm will abandon from profit sharing, so we can
rewrite the wage in the flexible and committed case as bww cf
100 ?
??
?? ?
?
??
 with
? ?
L
M???
?
???
?
1
0
. This means that the income components are the same and the
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same also in the absence of outsourcing, so that the labour demand elasticity is
00 ???
??
??
???
M
 . In this scenario the wage is smaller due to the wage moderation
effect of outsourcing but is equal in the different timing structure concerning profit
sharing.
We can sum up in the case of zero effort elasticity that the wages are the same,
but higher in the absence of outsourcing.
Proposition 6
a) If the effort elasticity is zero, the wages are in both timing structure
the same if the firm engage in outsourcing or not.
           b) If there is no outsourcing but a positive effort elasticity higher profit sharing
in the committed case will lead to a smaller wage in comparison to the
flexible case and vice versa.
6.  Flexible Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium
Unemployment
Now we study the implications of outsourcing cost and profit sharing on equilibrium
unemployment. Our focus is to characterize equilibrium unemployment as a function
of institutional features of labour market, defined by the benefit-replacement ratio, the
structure of compensation system and the outsourcing cost.
The wage formation by the monopoly labour union has the form
bAw ii ? ,                                                               (31)
in industry i , where the mark-up is defined by ? ? 11 ???? cc
c
iA ????
?  in the case of
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committed profit sharing (equation (11)) and
? ?
L
A
f
w
ff
f
i ??????
?
????
?
11
 in the
case of flexible profit sharing (equation (29)). We focus on the case with identical
industries in terms of the wage mark-up, i.e. AAi ? . In a general equilibrium the
outside option b  has to be specified as expected value of being not employed in one
of the industries
? ? ? ? uBeg
L
wub ??
?
?
?
?
? ????
??1 ,                               (32)
where u  is the equilibrium unemployment rate and B  the unemployment benefit.
According to (32) we assume that all identical industries adopt profit sharing as a part
of the workers’ compensation scheme so that an employed worker in one industry
faces the probability )1( u?  of being employed in another industry, which makes use
of a similar compensation scheme (for this kind of a standard justification, see e.g.
Nickell and Layard (1999), pp. 3048-3050 and Layard et al. (2005), p. 100-101). The
probability of being unemployed is characterized by u . In this case the individual
receives the unemployment benefit B . Moreover, we assume a constant benefit-
replacement ratio wBq /?  in the presence of unemployment, so that 10 ?? q . It is
important to mention that in (31) and (32) both outsourcing cost and profit sharing
affect the mark-up and the value of the outside option.
Combining (31) and (32) under assumption wBq /?  we can rewrite (31) as
? ? ? ? ? ? Auqweg
L
uAwuAw ??
?
?
?
?
? ?????
??11 .  From this the unemployment rate can be
expressed in the case of committed profit sharing as
? ?
? ?
wLw
egq
wLw
eg
Au
cc
??
??
???
???
?
1
11
. By using
? ??? we ?  so that ? ? ???weg / and by using
? ?
e
wM
e
wMwL
ce
wew
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
11 ??
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
??
?
? ??
??
? ??  so that
? ?
??
?
??
? ??
?
?
eL
M
wL 2
11
1
1 ?
?
?  the unemployment rate can now be expressed as follows
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where c? has been expressed in (19). In the absence of outsourcing we have
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u                                        (33b)
where
0?M
c? has been expressed in (20).
Now we look at the implications on equilibrium unemployment when profit
sharing is committed in terms of wage formation. Differentiating (33a) with respect to
outsourcing cost by using ? ? 0
2
11 ????
eL
MN ?  and
? ? 011 ?????? TNq ?
??? gives
? ? ? ? ? ?
1
1
??
2
2 ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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where ?????
dc
dA
dc
dwAA
dc
dA cc
w
c
c
c ?
? , ??c?  and
? ? 01
2
1
??
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
??
eL
M
eLc
MNc
? .
For analyzing the impacts of outsourcing cost on equilibrium unemployment we have
to distinguish two working channels, first the mark-up effect, and second the outside
option effect. Since both are opposed or ambiguous the influence of outsourcing cost
is a priori ambiguous. From our former analysis we know that higher outsourcing cost
will increase the base wage due to a less elastic labour demand, but there is also an
effect on the profit share, which we cannot identify. But the wage is increasing, since
the advantage of outsourcing is decreasing with higher outsourcing cost. On the other
hand higher outsourcing cost will reduce outsourcing demand and increase domestic
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labour demand, which implies a better employment chance and a better bargaining
position due to an increasing value of the outside option. Now the trade union can be
more aggressive, since the fear of dismissal employee are weaker, and set a higher
wage. So we find that the outside option effect is harmful for the aim of low
unemployment rates. Also the mark-up effect tends to be harmful for the wage income
part but here the effect of the profit income can reverse this negative employment
effect, but the mark-up effect is ambiguous. Therefore the effect of outsourcing cost
on equilibrium unemployment is ambiguous.
Differentiating (33a) with respect to profit sharing gives
? ? ? ? ? ?
1
1
??
2
2 ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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where ????
?? ? d
dwAA
d
dA c
w
c
c
, and ? ? ? ? 011
2
1
??
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
??
eL
M
eL
MN ??
?
?
? . The impact
of profit sharing on equilibrium unemployment is also a priori ambiguous for the
following reasons. Higher profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect on the mark-
up due to the direct effect via the opposed productivity and substitution channel and
due to the wage increasing indirect channel via a less elastic wage elasticity. So the
wage effect, which is described by the first term in brackets of (35a), is ambiguous.
On the other side there is an outside option effect, which is characterized by the
second term. Higher profit sharing leads to higher effort and increases the labour
demand. The outsourcing demand is decreasing, since a part of the former outsourcing
will be substituted by domestic effective labour, what is expressed in 0??N . This
leads for given wage to higher profits but it has to be weighted by the productivity.
Since the employment chance is increased, this means that it would be easier to find a
job in another industry. A better employment chance results in a higher outside
option, so that the trade union will be more aggressive and set a higher wage. So the
outside option effect has a positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.
In the absence of outsourcing the expression N  is simplified to 1?N  with
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0??N  so that equation (35a) by using ? ? Tq ????? 11 ?
???  can be re-expressed as
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This is also ambiguous in terms of equilibrium unemployment. But if
1
1
?
?
?
?  and
0
0
?
?M
c
d
Ad
?
, then higher profit sharing will decrease equilibrium unemployment.
In the case of flexible profit sharing equilibrium unemployment rate is
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 and by using
? ?
??
?
??
? ??
?
?
eL
M
wL 2
11
1
1 ?
?
?  it can be
expressed in the case of flexible profit sharing and flexible outsourcing as follows
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where f? has been expressed in (23). In the absence of outsourcing we have
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where
0?M
f? has been expressed in (25).
The analysis of changes in the unemployment rate is simplified by the assumption of
zero effort elasticity. We know that in this case there is no profit sharing neither in the
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committed nor flexible case. This means that the wages are identical but it does not
mean that outsourcing demand is zero. So we can analyze the effect of changes in
outsourcing cost on equilibrium unemployment for zero effort elasticity. In this
scenario the unemployment rate can be written as
q
A
uu fc
?
?
?? ?
?? 1
11
0
00
?
??
 with
1~
~
0 ?
?
? ?
?
?
A  and ? ?
L
M??? ??? 1~ where the amount of outsourcing and labour
demand are characterize as in the former analysis but with a constant effort of one and
with an adjusted labour demand elasticity and wage. The influence of outsourcing
cost on equilibrium unemployment can be written as
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? (see Appendix E). This expression shows that
only the mark-up is affected by the influence of outsourcing cost. Since the mark-up is
increasing by higher cost of external procurement, increasing outsourcing cost lead to higher
unemployment. This is reasonable, since higher outsourcing cost decrease the advantage of
outsourcing but results in a more comfortable position for the trade union. So the union can be
more aggressive and set a higher wage due to decreasing fear of substitution of the worker by
outsourcing. The higher mark-up results in a decreasing labour demand which implies a
negative employment effect.
We can summarize these findings to
Proposition 7
a) If there is profit sharing as a part of outside option in other
industries both outsourcing cost and profit sharing will have
ambiguous effects on equilibrium unemployment under committed
and flexible profit sharing. In the absence of outsourcing the results
are qualitatively similar.
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b) If the effort elasticity is zero, higher outsourcing cost will have an
enhancing effect on unemployment.
7.       Conclusions
We have analyzed the following questions associated with flexible outsourcing and
with both committed and flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic labour
markets. How does flexible outsourcing - which we assume to be substitute for
effective domestic labour - influence both wage formation and profit sharing? How
does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? We have also studied the
relationship between outsourcing, profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment.
We have shown that in both profit sharing scenarios lower outsourcing cost
lowers the wage. In the presence of flexile outsourcing profit sharing is a
supplementary or compensating part of income. If there is no outsourcing, profit
sharing has also an ambiguous character. In the presence of flexible outsourcing
optimal flexible profit sharing is positive but smaller than in the absence of
outsourcing. Moreover, lower outsourcing cost and higher wage will have ambiguous
effect on optimal flexible profit sharing.
In the case of zero effort elasticity there is of course no committed or flexible
profit sharing in the absence or presence of outsourcing. In these cases the wages as
the same both in the presence and absence of outsourcing. Under positive effort
elasticity without outsourcing higher profit sharing will lead to a smaller wage
compared to the flexible case and vice versa.
In terms of equilibrium unemployment the effects of outsourcing cost and
profit sharing are ambiguous both in the committed and flexible profit sharing. In the
absence of outsourcing profit sharing will also have an ambiguous unemployment
effect. Moreover, if effort elasticity is zero, lower outsourcing cost will decrease
unemployment.
There are new research topics associated with these issues. Very important
issues are to study the implications of labour taxation and labour tax reforms on
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effort, labour demand, outsourcing, wage formation, profit sharing, equilibrium
unemployment and social welfare. The question of how labour tax reform affects
unionized firms, which engage in outsourcing is analyzed by Koskela and Schöb
(2008), but they abstract from effort determination and the resulting productivity
effects. It is also important to do numerical simulations associated with various results
we have presented. Also one important research question would be to compare the
effects of flexible outsourcing, analyzed in this paper, with strategic outsourcing.
Which regime results in a higher degree of outsourcing?
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Appendix A:
Differentiating the wage formation (10) with respect to wage and profit sharing gives
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which can be expressed as
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Appendix B:
From the equations (19) and (20) we can look on the relationship of c?  and c?  by
analyzing the inequation cc ?? ? , which we can rewrite as
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which leads to
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Simplifying this expression we get after some simple transformations
??
?
??
? ??????????
eL
M
w
w
w
w
eL
M
2
11
2
1 ????? ??  .             (B2)
Appendix C:
Since equation (23) is an implicit expression we get for the derivative with respect to
profit sharing and outsourcing cost
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Using the conversion ? ? ? ? ? ?
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The derivative of the ratio of outsourcing and effective labour with respect to profit
sharing and outsourcing cost we can rewrite as
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Substituting (C4a) and (C4b) into (C2) give
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Differentiating of (23) with respect to profit sharing and base wage we get
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which we can simplify by using our former results to
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Appendix D:
From a comparison of equation (19) and (23) follows that fc ?? ? holds if
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This expression can be simplified to
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what is fulfilled if 0??w .
The same holds in the absence of outsourcing but here we have
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what is fulfilled for 0??w .
Appendix E:
The mark-up in the case of zero effort elasticity is
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the level of one. From the expression ? ? dc
dA
Aqdc
du f 0
0
2
0 1
1 ?
??
?
?
? ?
??
 we see that in
this case only the mark-up effect will drive the result. For the mark-up effect we find
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so we can concentrate on the third term. The sign of this term is negative if the
relationship
??
?
1
1
w
c
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dw  holds. If we plug into this expression our former result for
dc
dw  we get
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Using the earlier findings for w?
~  and c?
~  equation (E3) can be simplified to
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Since this is true, we know that the third term in (E2) has a negative sign and
therefore higher outsourcing cost raises the mark-up, i. e. 00 ??
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? .
